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I am pleased to offer some general comments about several
of the articles that will be contained in this issue of the Review.
Not having had the opportunity to read the articles in advance,
I must necessarily speak only in general terms on the themes
that they will no doubt discuss in careful detail.
First, the subject of federalism. I will not attempt in these
few pages even to begin to touch upon the broader scope of
that theme, but will include only a few personal observations
on the subject in the light of the theme of this year's Eighth
Circuit Judicial Conference, which is state-federal relations.
Speaking from my experience as a state court appellate
judge, I am aware that many members of the state judiciary
view the subject of federalism in terms of what they perceive to
be the federal judiciary's virtually unlimited power to review
and, perforce, overturn state court decisions in criminal cases.
What is not as widely perceived is that this power is in a
number of areas quite narrowly circumscribed.' Indeed, after
nearly five years on the federal appellate bench, I now wonder
why state court judges so often view themselves as mere way
stations on a defendant's road to certain victory in the federal
courts. The attitude that should prevail-and we federal
judges should do our part to spread the message-is that state
courts are in the front line of defense of constitutional protec-
tions and that our role is secondary and supplemental. True,
we federal judges have the independence that Article III life
tenure assures, but ultimately it is only through a vigorous, as-
sertive state judiciary that constitutional protections can be
t The Honorable Roger L. Wollman is a Judge of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. He received the B.A. from Tabor College in 1957, theJ.D. from the Univer-
sity of South Dakota in 1962 and the LL.M. from Harvard Law School in 1964.
1. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (federal court may not re-
view state court judgment based upon adequate, independent state ground); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment claim not cognizable in federal
habeas proceeding if state court provided full and fair hearing on the claim); 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988) (state court findings of fact entitled to presumption of cor-
rectness in federal habeas corpus proceeding).
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guaranteed in the first instance-and who would dispute that
wholesale vindication of constitutional rights at the state trial
court level is far more meaningful than case-specific vindica-
tion at the federal appellate level seven or eight years after the
fact.
When we federal judges do in effect overrule our state court
colleagues (although we prefer not to put it in those terms), we
do well-and would do well-not to indulge ourselves in the
sententiousness that can so easily and unintentionally find its
way into our opinions. The federal judiciary should not be the
natural home of hubris. Our duties under the supremacy
clause do not include the role of lord and master over the state
courts, and we should seek to dissipate any lingering percep-
tion to the contrary.
Nowhere is our respect for our state court counterparts
more essential than in federal habeas review of state death
penalty cases. These cases come to us after at least two rounds
of review in the state appellate system. At times the members
of the state's highest appellate court are sharply divided on the
factual and legal issues presented. Frequently the state court
has labored at length-and with the earnestness and attentive-
ness that every death penalty case by its very nature de-
mands-to give a constitutionally-adequate limiting
construction to an otherwise ambiguous, open-ended state
statute that purports to narrow the class of defendants upon
whom the death penalty may constitutionally be imposed. If
ever there is a time for judicial soul-searching, this is it. We
federal judges should not lose sight of the fact that we are en-
gaged in a joint, if not contemporaneous, effort with our state
court colleagues to ensure that constitutional requirements are
fully satisfied in this class of cases. That we may sometimes
differ in our understanding of what those requirements entail
should not be cause for resentment, so long as our opinions
are free of condescension and cavil.
Turning from federalism to the first amendment, I look for-
ward to reading the student comment on our recent decision
in the Purdy, Missouri, school dance case, Clayton v. Place.2
With the exception of one of our recent bankruptcy decisions
(of which more later), I know of no case in recent years in




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol16/iss3/1
INTRODUCTION
which the court has been so sharply divided in its denial of a
petition for rehearing. Indeed, those of us in the majority were
chided by our dissenting colleagues for turning a deaf ear to
the pleas of those students who beseeched us to free them
from religious tyranny and oppression,3 and for erecting "a de-
vious springboard for further destruction of the wall separat-
ing church and state." 4 In the face of these rebukes some of us
were tempted to borrow Richard John Neuhaus's delicious
phrase and gently suggest to our dissenting colleagues that
they had "fallen victim to polemical heat prostration." We
could also have responded by pointing out that while the town
of Purdy is probably not Missouri's answer to New Haven or
Berkeley, neither is it John Calvin's Geneva West. Although it
would have been good fun to make these observations, they
would have added little to the debate and thus were better left
unsaid, at least in the published opinion. I add these com-
ments here only to make the point that the members of our
court are able to express their individual views freely and vig-
orously without fearing loss of collegiality within the court. In-
deed, that is what collegiality is all about. However sharply
divided we may have been in the Purdy case (or any other case,
for that matter), the forcefulness of our rhetoric reflects deeply
held beliefs and should not be interpreted as an expression of
personal animosity or ill will.
It would have been interesting to see the Court grapple with
the issues in Clayton, but perhaps it is not surprising that the
Court chose not to grant certiorari, given the struggle it went
through in dealing with the creche and menorah in County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.6 In any event, I am
confident that the student comment will point out the error of
our ways and that we, dutifully chastened, will resolve to do
better in the future.
3. Clayton v. Place, 889 F.2d 192, 195 (Gibson, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing).
4. Id. at 197 (Lay, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
5. Neuhaus, What the Fundamentalists Want, COMMENTARY, May 1985, at 41, 41.
6. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989). That the Court is still sharply divided in its approach
to first amendment free exercise/establishment claims is illustrated by its recent deci-
sion in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595
(1990). For a critique of the Court's approach in these cases and a suggestion that
the Court focus its attention on the purpose of the first amendment-that of pro-
tecting religious pluralism, see McConnell, Tahing Religious Freedom Seriously, FIRST
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Space does not permit comment on every article within this
issue of the Review, so I will close by referring to the student
note on the discharge of intentional tort judgments through
Chapters 7 and 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. As I alluded to
above, our court recently issued a sharply divided decision in
Handeen v. LeMaire.7 Whether one agrees with Judge John R.
Gibson's carefully crafted majority opinion or with Judge Ma-
gill's powerful dissent, all will agree that the facts of the case
pitted Chapter 13's requirement of good faith against its lack
of Chapter 7's specific provision prohibiting discharge of debts
resulting from willfully or maliciously inflicted injuries. As the
majority opinion makes clear, the good faith requirement nar-
rowly prevailed. Whether it should have done so will no doubt
be the subject of much discussion by both bankruptcy judges
and practitioners within the circuit.8
In addition to our decision in Handeen, our earlier decisions
in Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank,9 and Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A. v.
Tveten, l0 are not calculated to make the jobs of bankruptcy
judges and practitioners any easier." Like Handeen, those
cases pitted the literal language of the Bankruptcy Code
against the court's intuitive feeling of what should be permit-
ted and what should not. That intuition won out in Norwest
Bank is clear from the majority opinion; that it should not have
is forcefully argued in Judge Arnold's dissenting opinion.
Those of us in the majority would be hard pressed to dispute
Judge Arnold's remark that we reached "a result that appeals
to one's general sense of righteousness."' 2 Well, if righteous-
ness exalteth a nation, perhaps a touch of it now and then will
not harm the federal judiciary.' 3
7. 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
8. See T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw, 278-79 (1986):
Unlike the situation with consensual credit, overextensions due to torts may
seem less deserving of discharge. Because of the social policy that calls for
tortfeasors to internalize the costs of these torts, impulse and incomplete
heuristics perhaps should not provide excuses from such internalization.
For these reasons torts present a much less appealing case for discharge
than do consensually created debts.
9. 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988).
10. 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).
11. See Comment, The Night Before Bankruptcy: The Eighth Circuit's Response to Bank-
ruptcy Estate Planning, 15 WM. MITCHELL LAW REV. 643 (1989).
12. Norwest Bank, 848 F.2d at 877 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
13. For a discussion of bankruptcy eve conversions of assets, see T. JACKSON,
supra note 8, at 275-78.
I will refrain from commenting on our decisions in In re NWFX, Inc., 864 F.2d
(Vol. 16
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Whatever the merits of our holdings in the Purdy school
dance case and the bankruptcy cases, we can be sure that we
have provided grist for the law review mill. And after all,
where would we judges be if it were not for the law reviews to
call attention to our errors? Painful though it often is to have
one's views exposed to trenchant criticism, that goes with the
job of judging. If those who write the articles are forthright
and honest in their criticism, then we judges should be equally
forthright and honest in accepting that criticism when it is
justly due. It is part of the function of the law reviews to edu-
cate and enlighten the judiciary, and I am confident that this
issue of the William Mitchell Law Review will perform that task
splendidly.
588 (8th Cir. 1988), In re NWFX, Inc., 864 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1989), and In re NWFX,
Inc., 881 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1989) (reargued en bancJan. 19, 1990). Suffice it to say
that the members of the bankruptcy bar may be forgiven if they suggest that those
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